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1980] NOTES
is one of specialized application and, thus, ought to be the primary
guide to decision making in this area. Fourth, despite the admirable
desire of Louisiana to preserve its civil law heritage, uniformity of
decisions in the area of negotiable instruments will serve to stabilize
interstate business transactions involving commercial paper. °8 In-
deed, the legislature's adoption of U.C.C. section 1-1021°9 compels
this conclusion.
While Aiavolasiti correctly settles the question of which Civil
Code provisions apply to the relationship between solidary sureties,
it leaves unresolved the proper utilization of negotiable instruments
law in regard to suretyship. It is hoped that the Louisiana Supreme
Court will clarify this troublesome area in its future opinions.
J.P. Hebert
THE CLASS ACTION AS A CONSUMER PROTECTION DEVICE:
State v. General Motors Corp.
The defendant sold over 1,400 Oldsmobiles with substituted
Chevrolet engines to Louisiana consumers, allegedly without disclos-
ing the substitution. Claiming violation of the Unfair Trade Prac-
108. Adoption of Article 3 [of the U.C.C.] by preserving a core of uniformity
for Louisiana should facilitate the multi-state transactions in which these in-
struments function....
.... Louisiana, at long last, [is brought] into a position of sharing with her
sister states a useful portion of the major benefits of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code.
.... On balance there is much that may be pointed to in Louisiana [sic]
new Commercial laws as representative of progress in the quest for certainty
and uniformity.
Message from Paul M. Hebert, Dean, LSU Law School, in R. HERSBERGEN, COMMER-
CIAL PAPER AND BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS IN LOUISIANA: THE COMMERCIAL LAWS
v to vii (1974).
109. LA. R.S. 10:1-102 (Supp. 1974) provides:
(1) This Title shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its pur-
poses and policies.
(2) The purposes and policies of this Title are
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to promote uniformity of the law among the various jurisdictions.
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tices and Consumer Protection Law,' the state Attorney General
filed a class action for injunction, restitution, and damages on behalf
of the Louisiana purchasers. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal af-
firmed the trial court's certification of the class action for injunction
and restitution, but found class action for actual damages prohibited
by the Unfair Trade Practices Law.2 The Louisiana Supreme Court,
on rehearing, affirmed the appellate court decision and held that a
class action seeking injunction and restitution for consumers can be
brought by the Attorney General under the Unfair Trade Practices
Law. State v. General Motors Corp., 370 So. 2d 477 (La. 1979).
The Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Law, enacted in 1972, ad-
dresses the problem that in many consumer cases the expense of
litigation so far outweighs probable recovery that consumers suffer
deceptive practices without seeking a legal remedy. 3 The federal
government enacted the Federal Trade Commission Act4 to alleviate
the consumer's dilemma;5 Louisiana and other states subsequently
enacted statutory remedies, largely modeled on the Federal Trade
Commission Act and the model Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer
Protection Act.' In general, the Louisiana statute creates the Gov-
ernor's Consumer Protection Division7 and delegates to that divi-
sion, to the Attorney General, and to the courts the means to in-
vestigate and remedy unfair practices.
Several features of Louisiana's law are particularly beneficial to
consumers. First, the statute defines unlawful conduct broadly,8 af-
1. LA. R.S. 5i:1401-18 (Supp. 1972).
2. State v. General Motors Corp., 354 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
3. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724,
724-26, 752-55 (1972).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970).
5. Breeden & Lovett, Louisiana's New Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law, 20 LA. B.J. 307, 310-12 (1973).
6. Breeden & Lovett, supra note 5, at 312; Comment, The Louisiana Unfair
Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act: An Analysis, 34 LA. L. REV. 634, 636-37
(1974).
In the 1960's the model act was produced as a result of collaboration between the
Federal Trade Commission and the Committee on Suggested State Legislation of the
Council of State Governments. The model Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protec-
tion Act grants broader remedies than the Federal Trade Commission Act by pro-
viding stronger administrative remedies and private actions for injured consumers.
Breeden & Lovett, supra note 5, at 311-12. See also Lovett, supra note 3, at 740-41;
Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part I Considerations of Equity, 49 B.U.L. REV.
211, 241-43 (1969).
7. LA. R.S. 51:1403-04 (Supp. 1972).
8. LA. R.S. 51:1405 (Supp. 1972 & 1977) provides in pertinent part: "Unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful." For a discussion of the import of
the generalized definition of unlawful conduct on consumers and competitors, see
Breeden & Lovett, supra note 5, at 312 & 321.
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fording the scope necessary to correct a wide range of trade abuses.
Second, the Consumer Protection Division has broad investigatory
and regulatory powers which foster efficient, flexible action.' Third,
the Attorney General is empowered to bring injunctive actions to
restrain prohibited practices,"° and courts are authorized to grant
restitution to consumers in connection with the state's actions."
Finally, the statute grants a private cause of action to the individual
consumer for the recovery of actual damages, including attorney's
fees and, if the purchaser can prove a knowing violation of the act,
treble damages." These provisions insure that even relatively small
claims can be pursued advantageously, enhancing a consumer's bar-
gaining position should he seek to settle and discouraging deceptive
acts by making them unprofitable.'3
Section 1409, granting a private action to injured consumers, ex-
pressly prohibits suit "in a representative capacity" for "actual
damages." Prior to the instant case, most commentators inter-
preted that language as a "bar on class actions,"'" the exclusion a
concession to business interests which speeded passage of the mea-
sure."6 Withholding class actions from private litigants was ration-
alized on the grounds that class actions would be "effective en-
couragement to consumer litigation in a quite limited proportion of
cases,"'" because of procedural problems in establishing the common-
ality of right required by the Code of Civil Procedure'" and in pro-
viding satisfactory notice to absent class members.'9 Also, the grant
9. The administrative remedies authorized include requests for voluntary compli-
ance, action for injunction, and civil penalties for recalcitrant defendants. LA. R.S.
51:1404, 1407, 1410, 1413 & 1416 (Supp. 1972).
10. LA. R.S. 51:1407 (Supp. 1972).
11. LA. R.S. 51:1408 (Supp. 1972). E.g., Breeden & Lovett, supra note 5, at 318-19;
Comment, Louisiana's Consumer Protection Law- Three Years of Operation, 50 TUL.
L. REV. 375, 385-87 (1976).
12. LA. R.S. 51-1409 (Supp. 1972). For a detailed description of the private action,
see Breeden & Lovett, supra note 5, at 319-21; Comment, supra note 11, at 387-89.
13. Lovett, supra note 3, at 747-48.
14. LA. R.S. 51:1409 (Supp. 1972). See note 51, infra.
15. Comment, supra note 11, at 387. See, e.g., State v. General Motors Corp., 370
So. 2d at 491 (Marcus, J., dissenting); Breeden & Lovett, supra note 5 at 321.
16. Whether or not to include the opportunity for class actions was clearly the
most controversial aspect in the legislative history of this law, and of roughly
comparable bills offered two years ago .... Business interests and their lobbyists
were extremely worried about class action dangers, and the progress of this bill
definitely was facilitated by an explicit exclusion of class action relief through
private litigations.
Breeden & Lovett, supra note 5, at 321.
17. Lovett, supra note 4, at 745.
18. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 591.
19. Lovett, supra note 3, at 745.
1980]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
of authority to courts to give discretionary restitution to aggrieved
consumers was the ight to compensate for denial of the class action
device.2 1
The usefulness of the class action as a consumer protection tool
has been much debated," as the nature and prerequisites of the pro-
cedure are often hurdles to its effective utilization."2 Certainly, the
Louisiana class action, as initially formulated, did not lend itself
readily to use ias a consumer protection tool. Though modeled upon
the original rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 24 article
591 of Louisiana's Code of Civil Procedure, rejecting "hybrid" and
"spurious" class actions, 5 authorizes only "true" class actions in
20. LA. R.S. 51:1408 (Supp. 1972).
21. Breeden & Lovett, supra note 5, at 321. Even the consumer overlooked by the
court in the state's injunctive suit is not excluded from the prospect of judicial relief:
"[OQnce the state had successfully enjoined an activity or obtained restitution for
aggrieved consumers, the private plaintiff who was not accorded relief in the state's
action goes into court with a prima facie case whenever he can establish that he was
damaged by the use of the proscribed practice." Comment, supra note 11, at 388.
22. Advocates for the use of the class action argue that the small amount of indi-
vidual claims in the typical consumer suit mandates class actions to insure compensa-
tion for victims and a deterrent effect on violators:
The processes of mass production, mass distribution, and mass consumption
make it increasingly likely that wrongful conduct by any person will injure not
just one or a few others, but a whole class of persons. The injury may be enor-
mous in the aggregate, but too, small to justify the expense of litigation by any
one victim. Unless the injured persons are allowed to litigate as a class, all of
them may be denied relief.
Kirkpatrick, Consumer Class Litigation, 50 ORE. L. REV. 21, 21 (1970). See Homburger,
State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 642 (1971) (noting
that class actions provide "a potent deterrent against large-scale antisocial behavior"
making them "a potent ally to administrative agencies"); Starrs, supra note 6, at 240-41
(encouraging class actions for injunctive relief in consumer cases).
23. The procedural limitations of the class action, and particularly the difficulty in
meeting the required commonality of right in consumer cases, is noted by Lovett,
supra note 3, at 745-46. The potential for abuse of the procedure is discussed by
Blecher, Is the Class Action Rule Doing the Job? (Plaintiff's Viewpoint), 55 F.R.D. 365
(1972); Simon, Class Actions- Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375
(1972).
24. Williams v. State, 350 So. 2d 131, 140-41 (La. 1977); Stevens v. Board of
Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 309 So. 2d 144, 149-50 (La. 1975); Note, Louisiana's
Useful Class Action: Williams v. State, 38 LA. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (1978).
25. Under the original federal rule 23, class actions based on common issues of
fact or law were little more than permissive joinder devices. Homburger, supra note
22, at 626-29. See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tI), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 376-86 (1967); Miller,
Problems in Administering Judicial Relief in Class Actions under Federal Rule
23(b)(3), 54 F.R.D. 501, 502 (1971).
The liberal joinder rules of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure make such class
actions superfluous: "There is no need for either the hybrid or the spurious class ac-
tion in Louisiana . . . . The liberality of cumulation of actions and of intervention
[Vol. 40
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which "the character of the right sought to be enforced" is "common
to all members of the class." 6 Under articles 591 and 592, judgment
in a class action binds all absent class members if the prerequisites
to maintenance of the action are met: the class is too large to make
joinder practicable, a right is common to all class members, and the
class is adequately represented by one or more members.27
The Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted the criteria for state
class actions in Stevens v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension
Fund," a class suit brought by a former member of the Shreveport
Police Department for refund of compulsory contributions to the
police pension fund. Stevens defined the requirement of commonal-
ity of right among class members, treated inconsistently by the cir-
cuit courts,29 and expressly adopted the criteria of federal rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."° Rather than reading alterna-
tively the criteria for amended rule 23(b)(1), (2), and (3) suits,31 the
accomplish the same purposes of the spurious class action directly and much more
simply." LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 591, comments (c) to (d). See also Stevens v. Board of
Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 309 So. 2d at 149.
26. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 591. See Homburger, supra note 22, at 627 (discussing
"true" class actions under the original federal rule 23).
27. See Comment, New Dimensions in Louisiana Class Actions, 36 LA. L. REV.
798, 799 (1976).
28. 309 So. 2d 144 (La. 1975).
29. The second and fourth circuits had held that a right is not common "if in fact
the claims are separate and distinct and the presence of all members of the class is not
necessary for the enforcement of the common right." Id. at 146. Thus, a class action
was available only if all class members could have been considered indispensable or
necessary parties, a stringent test limiting class actions. See, e.g., Stevens v. Board of
Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 295 So. 2d 36 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974) rev'd, 309 So. 2d
144 (La. 1975); Caswell v. Reserve Nat'l Ins. Co., 234 So. 2d 250 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1970).
The first circuit, however, used a "community of interest" test "similar to that ex-
pressly authorized by Code of Civil Procedure article 463(1) for permissive joinder."
Stevens v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 309 So. 2d 147. See, e.g., Bussie
v. Long, 286 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973). Cf. Verdin v. Thomas, 191 So. 2d 646
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1966) ("unity of interest" test). See also Note, supra note 24, at
1063-64.
30. Stevens v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 309 So. 2d at 150-51,
citing FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 provides:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the represen-
tative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class ac-
tion if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
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supreme court made each criterion an element of a test balancing
five factors. Careful scrutiny of the facts of each case is required to
determine: (1) whether separate suits would unduly burden courts
and prejudice later litigation; (2) whether denial of a class action
would threaten the loss of substantive rights, as when individual
claims are small; (3) whether the defendant denies liability on
grounds common to the class; (4) whether a common question of law
or fact outweighs questions affecting only individual claims; and (5)
whether a class action is the most efficient and just procedural vehi-
cle.2 The intent and effect of Stevens was to expand the availability
of the Louisiana class action, bringing within its ambit cases in
which common questions of law or fact predominate over individual
issues"z and making federal jurisprudence relevant to the Louisiana
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds'
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and effi-
cient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings in-
clude: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the pro-
secution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the
class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
Commentary on amended Rule 23 consistently treats the criteria listed in (b)(1), (2), and
(3) as applying to distinct situations. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 72 (3d ed.
1976); Kaplan, supra note 25, at 388-93; Miller, supra note 25, at 501; Simon, supra note
23, at 376.
However, precedent for the supreme court's refusal to read separately the three
kinds of class actions described in rule 23 can be found in the Uniform Class Actions
Act drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Scher, Opening State Courts to Class Actions: The Uniform Class Actions Act, 32
Bus. LAW. 75 (1976).
32. 309 So. 2d at 151.
33. Id at 150-51. The court noted, though, that "the existence of a common ques-
tion of law or fact does not by itself justify a class action." Id. at 151. The court also
stated that the federal criteria stress limiting the use of class actions to cases in which
the procedure will be clearly the most useful means to determine common rights. Id at
151.
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class action.34
The scope of the state class action was expanded further in
Williams v. State,35 a tort action brought by the inmates of the Loui-
siana State Penitentiary against the state for alleged food poisoning.
The supreme court certified the class action, despite some indication
that mass torts usually are inappropriate for class litigation," par-
ticularly where variable defenses and differing damages militate
against the predominance of common questions. 7 Applying the
Stevens test, Williams held that the possibility that class members
might be awarded differing recoveries does not defeat class cer-
tification ."
In General Motors the Louisiana Supreme Court faced the pro-
priety of a class suit under both the Unfair Trade Practices Law and
the class action provisions of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.
Interpreting the Unfair Trade Practices Law, the court distin-
guished restitution from actual damages 39 to avoid the implication
34. Comment, supra note 27, at 810; Note, supra note 24, at 1064-65 & 1069.
35. 350 So. 2d 131 (La. 1977).
36. See Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23, Proposed Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee].
37. The usefulness of the rule 23(b)(3) class action for mass torts is hotly con-
tested. The device was designed to enable claimants with small claims to vindicate
their rights collectively and to reach "cases in which a class action would achieve
economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformit of decision as to per-
sons similarly situated." Miller, supra note 25, at 502, quoting Advisory Committee,
supra note 36, at 102-03. But the procedure has been attacked as promoting "litigations
which would not otherwise have been brought" and coercing settlement of ill-founded
claims. Simon, supra note 23, at 377 & 379-80. E.g., Blecher, supra note 23, at 368;
Homburger, supra note 22, at 630.
38. 350 So. 2d at 136. For a discussion of the problems presented by variable
damages, see Note, supra note 24, at 1068 (fragmentation of the action into separate
suits hampering judicial management), & 1071-72 (problems in damage calculation and
distribution). See Blecher, supra note 23, at 372-73 (damage proof problems); Simon,
supra note 23, at 379, 386 (excessive awards to attorneys, due process problems with
innovative calculation devices). The problem of unclaimed damages is treated in detail
in Comment, Damage Distribution in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. CHI.
L. REV. 448 (1972).
Williams also responded to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), an anti-trust class action on behalf
of odd-lot stock traders, which mandated actual notice to class members who are iden-
tifiable through reasonable effort in federal class actions. Noting that federal and state
due process may require actual notice to all identifiable class members, the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Williams directed the trial court to provide notice to absentees.
Although the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for notice to absen-
tees, the supreme court recognized the authority of the trial judges to provide for
reasonable notice, which need not be formal service. 350 So. 2d at 137-38.
39. Id. at 486. The court based its distinction upon Civil Code articles 2545 and
2547 and the rationale employed by the appellate court.
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that the prohibition of representative suits by private litigants in
section 1409 might also forbid actions for restitution brought by the
state on behalf of consumers. Fusing authority granted the Attorney
General under section 1414 with that granted the courts in section
1408, the court determined that the Unfair Trade Practices Law
authorizes the Attorney General to bring class actions.4" Addressing
then the requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure,4 the court
first found the Attorney General a proper party to bring the
action.4 ' The required commonality of right among class members
was identified as the legal question of General Motor's duty to dis-
close the source of the Oldsmobile engines,"' an issue outweighing
variable defenses.4 The court concluded, on applying the Stevens
test, that a class action was the superior procedure to resolve the
claims of the Louisiana consumers. 5
General Motors, a four-three decision," is significant because it
announces that, under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Law, a
class action is available for consumer protection, at least if brought
by the Attorney General or a district attorney" and if the recovery
sought is limited to injunction and restitution. Since the availability
of a consumer class action was uncertain prior to General Motors,
the decision broadens the enforcement procedures of the Unfair
Trade Practices Law. But the decision is disquieting because both
the necessity and the practicality of the class action as a consumer
protection tool are questionable, and the court's application of the
Stevens test to the facts of General Motors does not show convinc-
ingly that a class action is the superior procedure for consumer liti-
gation.
40. 370 So. 2d at 485-87.
41. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 591-92.
42. 370 So. 2d at 487. The court determined that whether the Attorney General
brings the action himself or authorizes a consumer to do so is irrelevant.
43. Id at 489.
44. On original hearing, the variable defenses which General Motors might pre-
sent to individual claims had been found to preclude commonality. 370 So. 2d at 481
(original hearing). On rehearing, the court felt its determination of commonality was
mandated, by the possibility that "[a] contrary holding would permit a defendant to
defeat maintenance of a class action merely by alleging the existence of a possible
defense against some class members but not against others." 370 So. 2d at 489 (on
rehearing).
45. A class action was deemed the superior procedural vehicle because: (a) few
substantial claims had been filed, indicating that class members had little interest in
controlling separate actions; (b) the class action would dispose of almost all claims in a
single proceeding; (c) concentration in one forum weighed against the class action; but
(d) notice and manageability would present no severe problems. 370 So. 2d at 489-90.
46. Justice Marcus dissented with reasons, while Chief Justice Summers and
Justice Dennis reaffirmed the views they expressed on original hearing.
47. LA. R.S. 51:1417 (Supp. 1972) empowers district attorneys to institute and
prosecute actions "in the same manner as provided for the attorney general."
[Vol. 40
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The availability of a class action for restitution was questionable
under the language of the Unfair Trade Practices Law, which
neither explicitly sanctions nor expressly prohibits such an action.
Provisions of the Act allow the Attorney General to sue for injunc-
tion;48 permit the courts to give restitution to individuals found to
have been damaged by unfair trade practices;49 and give the Attor-
ney General authority to use "all other authority and procedures
available to persons under the Louisiana Civil Code, Code of Civil
Procedure and Revised Statutes" to enforce the Act." But the stat-
ute does not grant expressly to the Attorney General the right to
bring class actions, and their availability had to be resolved by im-
plications of other statutory provisions. A major hurdle to an infer-
ence of availability was the express ban on representative suits for
actual damages in section 1409. 5" In order to overcome the implica-
tion that the legislature did not intend to allow representative
suits, 2 the supreme court endorsed the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peal's ruling that restitution is distinguishable from actual damages
for the purposes of the Unfair Trade Practices Law. The fourth cir-
cuit based its ruling on the Civil Code redhibition articles;"a but as
the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Law was drawn from common
law sources, 4 reliance on the Civil Code was inapposite. 5 However,
restitution has been identified as distinct from expectation interests
at common law,5" and injunctive actions brought under consumer
48. LA. R.S. 51:1407 (Supp. 1972).
49. LA. R.S. 51:1408 (Supp. 1972).
50. LA. R.S. 51:1414 (Supp. 1972).
51. LA. R.S. 51:1409 (Supp. 1972) provides in part:
Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or movable property, cor-
poreal or incorporeal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of
an unfair or deceptive method, act or practice declared unlawful by R.S. 51:1405,
may bring an action individually but not in a representative capacity to recover
actual damages.
Justice Dennis pointed out that "the clear ban against class actions by private per-
sons contained in Louisiana Revised Statutes 51:1409" suggests that "the Legislature
did not intend to create a special kind of class action for aggrieved persons in connec-
tion with the State's suit for injunctive relief." 370 So. 2d at 483 (original hearing)
(Dennis, J., concurring).
52. See note 16, supra.
53. 354 So. 2d 770 & 775. (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
54. See notes 6-8, supra.
55. Louisiana's unfair trade practices act is modeled after the Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, drafted by the American Bar Association's Committee on
Unfair Competition and approved by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Law. Analogy to the Louisiana Civil Code articles on redhibi-
tion is therefore inappropriate to interpretation of this statute.
370 So. 2d at 491 (on rehearing) (Marcus, J., dissenting).
56. Restitution protects society's interests against unjust enrichment and unjust
impoverishment in a situation wherein one party has conferred a value in exchange for
19801
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protection statutes in common law jurisdictions have resulted in a
restitution award to consumers to restore the status quo. 7 By identi-
fying "actual damages" in section 1409 with expectation interests
and consequential damages at common law,58 the court could assert
legitimately that the ban on class actions for actual damages of sec-
tion 1409 does not restrict representative suits for restitution.
A possible consequence of the court's damages ruling is the alle-
viation of the variable damage problem in consumer class actions. 9
The prayer for restitution in General Motors sought four alternative
methods of restitution." By specifying the alternative deemed most
suitable, a court could order General Motors to fulfill the order
"across the board" to injured class members, thereby avoiding the
problems presented by class actions involving differing damages.
Purchasers who suffer additional expenses as a result of the substi-
a promise the enriched party fails to perform. Its legal measurement is usually the cor-
relation between the promisor's gain and the promisee's loss, seeking to return the
promisee to his position before the promise was made. It is distinguishable from expec-
tation interest, which tries to put the promissee in the condition he would have been in
had the promise been kept. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 53-55 (1937). Accord, J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS
§§ 14-4 & 15 (2d ed. 1977). Cf. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 94 (4th ed. 1971) (election
to sue for restitution in tort cases).
Because restitution interest involves both unjust enrichment and unjust impover-
ishment and seeks to correct an injustice rather than to bring into being a new situa-
tion, restitution interest has the strongest claim to judicial relief at common law.
Fuller & Perdue, supra note 56, at 56.
57. In Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971), the New Jersey
Supreme Court, interpreting a consumer protection statute substantially similar to
Louisiana's, allowed refund of purchase price to buyers of books fraudulently misrepre-
sented and grossly over-priced, in an action brought by the state attorney general.
Accord, State v. Ralph Williams' N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wash. 2d 298, 553
P.2d 423 (1976) (distinguishing between an order for restitution and class action for
damages). See also Kugler v. Koscat Interplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216, 293 A.2d
682 (1972).
58. The appellate court had defined "actual damages" as "relief other than the re-
fund of the purchase price and the return to the status quo that constitute resti-
tution." 354 So. 2d at 775.
59. The problems inherent in class actions involving variable damages are sug-
gested in note 38, supra.
60. 370 So. 2d at 478 & 484 n.1. The alternative forms of restitution sought were:
(1) return of the vehicles and an order to General.Motors to return the purchase'
price; or
(2) an order requiring General Motors to replace the substituted engines at no
cost to the consumers; or
(3) return of the vehicles and an order to General Motors to replace them with
new automobiles equipped with Oldsmobile engines; or
(4) an order to General Motors to pay each aggrieved customer an amount in
money damages equal to the diminution in value of his vehicle and to compensate
him for all inconvenience occasioned by the substitution.
[Vol. 40
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tuted engine would retain their rights to seek compensation for ac-
tual damages in private actions.
However, as attractive as this alternative is, of the four alterna-
tive orders requested by the state in General Motors, only the first,
return of the vehicles to General Motors and of the purchase price
to the consumers, constitutes restoration of the status quo prior to
contract formation, the traditional notion of restitution.6 1 This
remedy seems drastic in light of the probability that the Oldsmobile
purchasers sustained little actual harm from the substitution.2 The
most reasonable remedy sought by the state, an order requiring
General Motors to pay each purchaser monetary damages equivalent
to the diminution in value of his automobile, is accompanied by a re-
quest for consequential damages and does not seek to return the
parties to the condition they would have been in if the sales had
never been made. Thus the concept of restitution employed by the
court requires further clarification.
Moreover, the damages/restitution distinction raises problems in
construing the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Law. Section 1409
grants to private litigants the right to sue for actual damages; but
since the court has distinguished actual damages from restitution,
the distinction could be read to preclude individual suits for restitu-
tion under the consumer protection statute."3 A consumer could still
seek restitution in a redhibition suit," but in order to receive treble
damages, his action should be based on the Unfair Trade Practices
Law, and he should claim "damages.""5 But the permissibility of suit
for restitution based on the Unfair Trade Practices Law is uncertain
in light of the court's rationale. Because the purpose of the General
Motors ruling is to extend consumer protection, 6 it is unlikely that
the court will read section 1409 to authorize only actions for actual
damages and not for restitution; to do so would narrow a plaintiff's
alternatives and restrict the effectiveness of his statutory remedy.
But if, to avoid restricting the private right of action, section 1409's
61. Moreover, restitution is not available as a remedy for partial breach of a con-
tract, and the injured party is required to repudiate the contract. J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, supra note 56, at 572-73.
62. Section 1409 only grants a remedy to plaintiffs with ascertainable loss; clearly,
restitution by refund of the purchase price would, paradoxically, constitute "restitu-
tion" grossly in excess of harms actually suffered, at least by those consumers who did
not file suits against General Motors.
63. Justice Marcus, in dissent, maintained that the court's rationale would "allow
an injured consumer to file suit seeking damages, but would preclude him from seek-
ing restitution." 370 So. 2d at 491 (on rehearing).
64. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2545 & 2547.
65. LA. R.S. 51:1409 (Supp. 1972). See note 54, supra.
66. See 370 So. 2d at 487-88.
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prohibition of representative actions is read to address only suits
for actual damages, nothing in the statute would forbid private liti-
gants from bringing class actions for restitution. The court's reason-
ing in General Motors supports this interpretation, which will argu-
ably expand the private right of action. Thus the damage/restitution
distinction creates ambiguity in section 1409, and the consumer's
private action may be either narrowed or expanded by future rul-
ings seeking consistency with General Motors.
Less significant, but also questionable, is the finding by the
court of statutory authorization for the Attorney General to bring a
consumer class action. Relying on the broad enforcement powers
that section 1414 confers on the Attorney General, the court never-
theless found it necessary to grant to him the discretionary power
that section 1408 confers on the courts to give relief to injured con-
sumers.17 Arguably, this expands the powers that the legislation
grants the Attorney General, clouds the clarity of the statute, and,
more significantly, renders less persuasive the court's finding of
legislative intent to permit a class action, a problematical issue in
any case. The court may have been motivated to put "teeth" into
the legislation, since a class action is a potent deterrent to a willful
violator. 8 But the need for the procedure is questionable, given the
broad scope of the private right of action.
Determination that class actions are permitted by the Unfair
Trade Practices Law does not foreclose inquiry as to their propriety
under the Code of Civil Procedure. In order to find a class action
against General Motors proper under articles 591-92, the court had
to determine whether the Attorney General is a proper party to
bring the action and whether the Oldsmobile purchasers shared the
commonality of right required in a Louisiana class action. The court
answered the first inquiry affirmatively, relying on section 1414 of
title 51.9 But authorization in the Unfair Trade Practices Law does
not answer the requirement of the Code of Civil Procedure that the
plaintiff be a member of the class."0 As Justice Dennis points out,
67. Id. at 485-87.
68. The deterrent effect of class actions in consumer cases is discussed by Bider-
man, Consumer Class Actions Under the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act, 4 N.M. L.
REv. 49 (1973); Kirkpatrick, supra note 22, at 21; Starrs, supra note 6, at 240-41.
69. Section 1414 allows the Attorney General to use all lawful procedures to en-
force the consumer protection law; the court reasoned that if the legislature had in-
tended to forbid his bringing a class action, "this was the place to do it." 370 So. 2d at
486.
70. As former Chief Justice Sanders argued:
It is true that Louisiana Revised Statutes 51:1414 allows the Attorney General
to use all other existing authority in actions to enforce the Unfair Trade Practices
Law. This section makes clear, however, that the authority applies only to "ac,
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section 1414 might just as well have intended to exclude class ac-
tions," because the Attorney General is not a class member. How-
ever, the state can sidestep the problem by joining a class member
as a named representative, as in the instant case.
A more telling problem is the court's reversal of its holding on
original hearing on the required commonality of right." On original
hearing, the supreme court found "substantial dissimilarities"
among the claims of the class members.73 General Motors could
assert different defenses to individual claims by showing differences
in representations made during the sales; also, the buyers' subjec-
tive expectations and personal awareness of the substitution are
relevant, particularly as some consumers were probably indifferent
and therefore not aggrieved. Though a defendant clearly should not
be able to defeat a class action by alleging differing defenses," the
Stevens balancing test would defeat such a facile maneuver. Yet in
the instant case potentially wide variations in the conditions sur-
rounding individual purchases bear directly on General Motors'
liability, because the right to proceed under the consumer protection
statute is granted only to persons with ascertainable losses." To ig-
nore factual evaluation of loss in favor of the possible existence of a
duty to disclose is to substitute a generalization for analysis of fact,
an approach inconsistent with the Stevens rationale.
tions on behalf of the state." The state, itself, can bring no class action for restitu-
tion and damages, because among other impediments it is not a member of the
class.
370 So. 2d at 482 (original hearing) (Sanders, C.J., concurring).
71. 370 So. 2d at 483 (original hearing) (Dennis, J. concurring).
72. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 591.
73. The alleged violation of Revised Statutes 51:1405 was a common issue at law
and General Motors' production of all the automobiles involved a common question of
fact. 370 So. 2d at 479 (original hearing). But the court, finding "no additional similari-
ties," noted:
In order to make a showing that other similar legal and factual relationships
are common to the claims of the members of the class it is necessary to inquire
into each and every purchase . . . .A determination then must be made if any
representations by their dealer or salesman to individual buyers were made
regarding the source of the engine installed in the automobile purchased. Only in
such an inquiry, by the testimony of the witnesses and parties to the sales trans-
action, could General Motors defend itself against the claim of unfairness and
deceit.
Id at 480. However, if General Motors had a duty to disclose the substitution and
failed to do so, the representations made by individual dealers would be immaterial to
General Motor's breach of duty, though the subjective expectations of the purchasers
would still bear on liability under section 1409.
74. In the instant case General Motors had not answered, and the defenses it may
have asserted to individual liability are an open question.
75. LA. R.S. 51:1409 (Supp. 1972).
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The court's application of the Stevens test in General Motors
was less thorouh than the Williams analysis. In Williams the con-
centration of class members favored focusing the litigation in a
single forum and simplified management problems.7 But the circum-
stances surrounding the instant case do not suggest so clearly that
judicial efficiency, forum convenience, or manageability will be fur-
thered by representative suit. The court found in General Motors
that the small number of suits already filed suggests that a class ac-
tion would be efficient." But a paucity of separate claims may just
as logically indicate that few class members are aggrieved. In that
case, class action certification simply encourages litigation."8 The
fact that a class action consolidates individual claims into a single
suit does not make the action efficient per se if it spawns litigation
which otherwise would not have been brought. Also, the efficiency
of a class action depends to some extent upon the desirability of
litigating all the claims of the class in a single forum."9 The court, in
General Motors, conceded that forum convenience "militates against
the use of the class action,"' but apparently accorded the finding lit-
tle weight. The fact that class members are scattered across the
state bodes ill for manageability, particularly in giving notice to
absentees."1 As in Williams, the court suggests that absentees be
notified, not only of the existence and disposition of the suit, but
also of "incidental episodes '"82 occurring during litigation. Notice,
presumably by mail, to 1,467 consumers renders questionable the
court's determination that notice costs will be "not unreasonable"
and that "manageability is no acute problem in this case." 3 Insofar
as one goal of a class action is to benefit the judiciary by conserving
its resources, the court appears to be doing itself no favors in the in-
stant case.
76. 350 So. 2d at 136.
77. 370 So. 2d at 489-90. The determination is consistent with the Williams state-
ment that "the lower the number of additional suits filed, the more useful is the class
action." 350 So. 2d at 135. Accord, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); Comment, Mass Accident
Class Actions, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1615, 1636 (1972).
78. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 22, at 21; Simon, supr" -note 23, at 377-78 & 386.
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
80. 370 So. 2d at 490.
81. See generally Blecher, supra note 23, at 372-73; Maraist & Sharp, Federal Pro-
cedure's Troubled Marriage: Due Process and the Class Action, 49 TEX. L. REV. 1, 31
(1970); Miller, supra note 25, at 511-13; Simon, supra note 23, at 388-89; Comment,
supra note 27, at 811-12; Note, supra note 24, at 1068-71.
82. 370 So. 2d at 490. The court was not certain that actual notice is required in
state class actions by Eisen, see note 38, supra, but, as in Williams, chose to provide
for actual notice in the interest of fairness. In the instant case, names and addresses of
class members were to be obtained from defendant's sales lists.
83. Id.
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The holding of General Motors is a procedural decision, intended
to implement the policies underlying the consumer protection law:"
to compensate injured consumers and to deter unfair trade prac-
tices.85 Certainly these goals deserve all the protection courts can
afford. The ultimate question raised by General Motors is whether
class actions brought by the Attorney General will in fact promote
either goal. The question is important, because the instant case sug-
gests problems inherent in class litigation of consumer claims."
Practical problems of management, notice, forum convenience, and
variable defenses indicate that the typical consumer class action
may be neither easily manageable nor judicially economical; thus,
promotion of consumer protection by class actions may be dearly
bought. The extent to which class actions are needed to insure
deterrence and victim-compensation may warrant reconsideration.
The provisions of Louisiana's Unfair Trade Practices Law, par-
ticularly section 1409, seem adequate to meet the goal of victim-
compensation. If a consumer suffers an "ascertainable loss" as the
result of a deceptive practice, section 1409 makes it worthwhile for
him to bring a private action.87 The recovery provisions of the pri-
vate right of action protect even consumers who sustain small
losses.88 The compensation offered by Louisiana's statute is equiva-
lent to that afforded consumers in many other jurisdictions," so that
84. In determining how the legislature, intended the courts to define and apply the
concept of allowing a class action to enforce rights with a common character, we
are mindful of the basic goals or aims of any procedural device: to implement the
substantive law, and to implement that law in a manner which will provide maxi-
mum fairness to all parties with a minimum expenditure of judicial effort.
Id. at 488, quoting Stevens v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 309 So. 2d at
151.
85. Breeden & Lovett, supra note 5, at 308-10; Comment, supra note 11, at 375.
86. Recurring problems in large-scale class actions which are particularly relevant
to consumer suits include:
(1) typicality of claims. Kirkpatrick, supra note 22, at 31-34; Comment, supra
note 77, at 1619-20;
(2) -cost of notice. Blecher, supra note 23, at 372; Maraist & Sharp, supra note 81,
at 13; Comment, supra note 29, at 811-12;
(3) creative judicial management. Homburger, supra note 22, at 657-58; Miller,
supra note 25, at 503-05, 509-12;
(4) differing damages. Comment, supra note 77. Uniform damages to all class
members may be available under the restitution theory of General Motors. See
text at note 61, supra.
87. Section 1409 grants attorney's fees and costs to a successful plaintiff; if he can
show that the defendant's deceptive act was intentional, the court is mandated to
award treble damages.
88. Lovett, supra note 3, at 745, 747-48; Breeden & Lovett, supra note 5, at 320.
89. Lovett, supra note 3, at 740-41. Cf. Biderman, supra note 67, at 52 (award of
costs and attorney's fees under New Mexico Consumer Protection Law).
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anyone with actual loss can find relief.9" In some consumer cases, the
common interest of class members may make a class action the most
effective procedure.9' But in most cases a class action for compensa-
tion will be unnecessary in Louisiana; the only persons excluded
from benefit of the private action are those who can find no loss,
and to encourage litigation on their behalf is pointless.
The deterrent effect of class actions, however, is noted fre-
quently92 as the cost of defending class suits and the adverse public-
ity they generate discourages willful trade deception. But it is sober-
ing to note that, though consumer protection has been identified as
an express goal of federal rule 23(b)(3),9" recent federal decisions
show a trend toward closing federal courts to class actions,94 in an
attempt, at least partially, to "prevent federal courts from being
swamped by unwieldy, frivolous class suits."95 The federal experi-
ence has led to limitations on the procedure in order to avoid
spurious actions and undue pressure on defendants;9" the federal ex-
ample, then, suggests caution. Also, the efficacy of the class action
as a consumer protection device is not firmly settled, particularly in
90. Even if a claim is too small to justify hiring counsel, city and justice of the
peace courts are available for self-representation. Comment, supra note 11, at 379.
Also, a relevant policy consideration is whether the staff of the Attorney General
or of the district attorney is the best party to ensure consumer restitution, particu-
larly as the provision granting attorney's fees makes available, even to economically
disadvantaged consumers, counsel from the private sector.
91. Kirkpatrick, supra note 22, at 33.
92. Biderman, supra note 67, at 53; Blecher, supra note 23, at 368-69; Starrs, supra
note 6, at 240-41; Comment, The Products Liability Class Suit: Preventive Relief for
the Consumer, 27 S.C. L. REV. 229, 248-49 (1975).
93. Kirkpatrick, supra note 22, at 33-34; Comment, Federal and State Class Ac-
tions: Developments and Opportunities, 46 Miss. L.J. 39, 51-52 (1975).
94. Eisen makes class action in a federal court financially onerous by requiring
the class representative to provide actual notice to all known class members. Zahn v.
International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), requires that in diversity cases all class
members, named and absent, meet individually the jurisdictional amount requirement
of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Zahn requirement will effectively close federal courts to most
diversity class suits, as only in exceptional cases will each class member meet the
$10,000 jurisdictional amount requirement. The financially burdensome notice require-
ment imposed by Eisen will further discourage class litigation in federal courts. With
the federal courts closing their doors to class actions, state courts will become the only
forums available for class suits which involve no federal questions. E.g., Scher, supra
note 31, at 85-86; Comment, supra note 27, at 799-800; Comment, supra note 93, at
45-53; Note, supra note 24, at 1066; Note, Class Actions-Closing the Doors to the
Federal Courts: Zahn v. International Paper, 39 Mo. L. REV. 447, 452-53 (1974); Note,
Civil Procedure-Class Actions-Amending Rule 23 in Response to Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 53 N.C. L. REV. 409 (1974).
95. Comment, supra note 96, at 53.
96. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 570 (2d Cir. 1968); Lovett, supra
note 3, at 746.
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cases when the defendant's conduct was not intentionally decep-
tive. 7 Other alternatives may satisfy the deterrent goal of consumer
legislation with less strain on judicial resources. One such alter-
native is the imposition of a civil fine," to be imposed not merely, as
at present, for violation of an injunction, but upon a court's finding,
after adversarial hearing, that a defendant knowingly engaged in a
deceptive practice.
Adequate compensatory measures presently exist in the Unfair
Trade Practices Law, and deterrence could be strengthened by leg-
islative amendment. However, in the interest of discouraging decep-
tive conduct, the state supreme court, by allowing the Attorney
General to bring class actions, has fashioned an additional consumer
protection tool, albeit as yet a blunt one. It will be the task of the
lower courts to hone the instrument for effective use in specific
cases. Ultimately, the wisdom of the court's decision will depend
upon the way it is applied in future actions. Careful attention to the
facts of each case in light of the Stevens test will be essential if
class actions are to effectuate the consumer protection General
Motors seeks to promote.
Kelly Mangum
THE PROSECUTOR'S DILEMMA - A DUTY TO DISCLOSE
OR A DUTY NOT TO COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR
In a series of cases following the United States Supreme Court
decision of United States v. Agurs,' the Louisiana Supreme Court
has significantly altered its approach to the prosecutor's duty of
97. Obviously, deterrence is relevant only to intentional offenders, and the com-
mon law class actions which the appellate court had cited as precedent for allowing
class suits to be brought by the state for restitution all involved intentional violations
by defendants. Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971); Kugler v. Koscot In-
terplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216, 293 A.2d 682 (1972); State v. Ralph Williams'
N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wash. 2d 298, 553 P.2d 423 (1976).
98. Section 1416 provides a maximum fine of $5000 per violation of any injunction
issued under sections 1407 or 1408. The Louisiana fine is lower than those in most
other jurisdictions, which generally are about $10,000. See Lovett, supra note 3, at 739
(discussion of civil penalties in a majority of states with a deceptive practice statute).
1. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
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